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Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(b): A
More Certain Definition of Resident
I. Introduction
Millions of people enter the United States each year.' Some
come to America to avoid political instability,2 others come to be
with family already in this country.3 Each receives the constitutional
benefits of free speech, religion, and privacy4 granted to all people
within United States jurisdiction. It is a modern day axiom that
those enjoying the benefits of living in this country pay for the privi-
lege through the imposition of federal income tax.
The proper time to tax has always been a central issue in the
analysis of federal taxation. 5 Related to the timing question is the
equally difficult problem of determining the appropriate circum-
stances under which a tax may be imposed on those whose residen-
tial status is undetermined. People who were not born in this country
or who are not citizens by blood are faced with a number of impor-
tant questions concerning their resident tax liability; At what point
does a person sufficiently enjoy United States benefits and privileges
in order to justify imposition of a tax?' Is the receipt of such benefits
even necessary for the proper imposition of taxes?
7
The question of an alien's residential status encompasses the
traditional tax questions of gain, control, and timing, and augments
them with a jurisdictional issue that by its nature demands resolu-
tion before any other.8 The United States may not impose a tax
1. See 1978 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 41 [hereinafter
cited as I.N.S. ANN. REP.].
2. See NAT'L COMMISSION FOR MANPOWER POL'Y, MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POL-
ICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL REP. No. 20 (1978). The Immigration and Nationaliza-
tion Service classifies these aliens as nonimmigrant. This is a broad category encompassing all
who are admitted to the United States for a specific reason. Thus it is difficult to determine
exactly how many aliens enter the United States each year specifically for asylum.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. 1, IV, V, IX, XIV.
5. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 71 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
CHIRELSTEIN].
6. Though some courts have held receipt of benefit is not a prerequisite to taxation, e.g.,
Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631, 632 (1st Cir. 1968), it is at least a factor to be
considered in the determination of whether a person should be subject to tax as a United
States citizen. See United States v. Lucienne D'H de Benitez Rexach, 558 F.2d 37 -(st Cir.
1976).
7. See Benitez Rexach, 390 F.2d 631 (lst Cir. 1968).
8. The question of residence is really one of jurisdiction. For a clear discussion of these
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before it has sufficient jurisdictional contacts with the alien either
through his citizenship or residence. 9 Thus, analysis of the jurisdic-
tional contacts necessary to impose taxation further complicates the
already difficult issues involved in determining proper taxation of
aliens.
Until 1984 the complexity involved in determining aliens resi-
dence was reflected in both conflicting case law'0 and piecemeal leg-
islation." This made prediction of the likely tax consequences of
contact with the United States difficult and uncertain. This confused
state of the law, with its concomitant difficulties in administration
led to enactment of section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.12
The purpose of this discussion is four-fold. First, it seeks to ar-
ticulate the central concepts underlying taxation of nonresidents and
residents. In so doing, the discussion evdeavors to show the impor-
tance of section 7701(b). Second, it attempts to canvas the case law
and pertinent regulations and rulings and highlight the ambiguities
therein. Third, the discussion will address the essential features of
section 7701(b) and illustrate Congress' new approach to the prob-
lem of determining resident status for aliens. Finally, the policy im-
plications of section 7701(b) are examined and suggestions for fur-
ther improvement are made.
II. Taxation of Residents and Nonresidents
Though federal income tax is essentially a tax on transactions,13
the concept does not exist in a vacuum. In order for an otherwise
taxable transaction to be subject to United States federal tax, it
must first be recognized as part of the community of transactions in
which either the income's source or the parties to the transaction are
so closely connected with the United States, that imposition of
United States tax would be appropriate. The two theories of jurisdic-
tion under which taxes may be imposed focus on the source of in-
basic concepts see, E. OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. INCOME TAXATION, PART
Two: TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ON U.S. SOURCE
INCOME 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OWENs].
9. It follows logically that if the United States does not have jurisdiction to tax an alien,
issues of timing, gain, and control are necessarily moot.
10. The Benitez Rexach decision is arguably in conflict with Lucienne D'H de Benitez.
The jurisdictional standards imposed by the respective cases differ on the question of whether
receipt of citizenship benefits is a quid pro quo to United States taxation. See Benitez Rexach,
390 F.2d at 632. But see Lucienne D'H de Benitez Rexach, 558 F.2d at 42.
11. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
12. The legislative history for I.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984) is found in H.R. REP. No.
432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 468.
13. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 71. The author states that income tax is a tax on
transactions instead of being a tax on income in the economic sense. Dividends, interest and
rents, gains on sales of property, salaries, wages and fees are all taxable because they occur
through the medium of "exchange." Id. (emphasis in original).
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come14 and the residential status of the taxpayer.1 5 The first theory
is based on the notion that if an individual's income is derived from
the United States, then some restitution must be made to the United
States as compensation for the opportunity to produce the. income.
The source rules impose tax on nonresident individuals who are not
otherwise subject to tax.' 6 This holds true in some instances even
when the income is only indirectly derived from United States
sources.
17
The second theory concerns the residential status of the tax-
payer. This jurisdictional concept has been the source of much con-
fusion and is therefore the focus of this discussion. An individual
who is classified as a nonresident alien is taxed only on his United
States source income. The extent to which he is taxed on this source
income depends upon whether the activity producing the income is a
passive investment activity 8 or an active trade or business.' 9 In no
instance, however, is a nonresident alien taxed on income which has
no connection to the United States. In contrast, both United States
citizens20 and resident aliens are taxed on their world-wide income."
Thus, the difference between a person treated as a resident alien and
a person treated as a nonresident alien is substantial. It can mean
the difference between taxing all of a person's world-wide income or
taxing only United States income. Given the importance of nonresi-
dent alien status for tax purposes, the question of what criteria are
used to evaluate an alien's residential status becomes vitally
important.
14. See P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 49, 58 (1977).
15. See R. POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 21-29
(1982) [hereinafter cited as POSTLEWAITE & COLLINS].
16. Id. at 21.
17. Typically, the nonresident alien is taxed only on income that is directly traceable to
a source in the United States. The marginal rate of this tax will then be determined by the
alien's level of participation in that source. If the alien is an active participant in a trade or
business, he will be taxed at the marginal rate appropriate to the dollar amount of his gain. If
his participation is at a level of passive investment, he will be taxed at the statutory rate of
thirty percent. I.R.C. § 871(a) (West 1984). Under § 864(c)(4)(B), however, certain types of
foreign income are subject to taxation on the grounds that they are effectively connected to a
United States trade or business. POSTLEWAITE & COLLINS, supra note 15, at 21 n.l.
18. The distinction between the passive investment activity and active trade or business
is used throughout the Code. See I.R.C. § 212 (P-H 1984) (deduction for expenses incurred in
the production of income); see also I.R.C. § 165 (P-H 1984) (deductions for expenses incurred
in an active trade or business).
19. See OWENS, supra note 8, at 4.
20. At first glance, determination of citizenship appears to be an easy matter. But for
the unsophisticated taxpayer who is poorly versed on Supreme Court immigration decisions, it
can be a convoluted and arbitrary process. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). See
also, POSTLEWAITE & COLLINS, supra note 15, at 3 n.1, 9.
21. Id. at 4.
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III. Pre-Code Guidance
Prior to enactment of section 7701(b), there were three sources
of guidance for the would-be nonresident concerning determination
of his residential status. First, regulations promulgated by the Trea-
sury Department were by far the most influential source of legisla-
tive guidance for both the Internal Revenue Service and the tax-
payer.2 2 The Internal Revenue Service Rulings served as a secondary
source of information on the issue. Finally, case law, through its
analysis of the Regulations and Rulings, served to interpret the two
legislative sources of guidance and to highlight the inadequacy of
their subjective approach.
A. Treasury Regulations and Rulings
Residence is defined by Federal Treasury Regulations (Regula-
tions) in section 1.8971-2.2' The Regulations state that anyone who
is not a mere sojourner or transient in the United States be consid-
ered a resident and be subject to the resultant tax consequences.24
This determination was to be made on the basis of a two-pronged
test. Under the Regulations, an individual's residential status de-
pends upon the objective criteria of the length and nature of his
stay,2 5 and upon his subjective intentions concerning those criteria."
The inherent subjectivity involved in ascertaining another per-
son's intentions is sufficient in and of itself to ensure that determina-
tion of an individual's residential status will be marred by uncer-
tainty. The Regulations, however, went further in their pursuit of a
viable residence test. They promulgated a set of presumptions con-
cerning the length and nature of the alien's stay in the United
States. 1 Unfortunately, because the presumptions were rebuttable
by the taxpayer on a showing of sufficient evidence to the contrary,
uncertainty and consequent litigation increased .2  The difficulties
22. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2 (1957), T.D. 6258, republished in T.D. 6500 (1960).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957) states that an alien is a resident of the United
States when he is "actually present in the United States . . . [and] not a mere transient or
sojourner .... "
24. Thus it was wise for the would-be nonresident to choose a definite departure date
within a reasonably short time after arrival. See POSTLEWAITE & COLLINS, supra note 15, at 5
n.9.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957).
26. Id.
27. The Regulations state that if an alien comes to the United States, "for a definite
purpose which in its nature may be promptly accomplished he is a transient." Treas. Reg. §
1.871-2(b) (1957).
28. See Joyce de La Begassiere, 31 T.C. 1031 (1959), affd per curiam 272 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1960) (nonresident status is determined on basis of visa status). In this case the court
stated in dicta that "some permanence within borders" was all that was necessary to establish
residence. Yet the court was unable to find such permanence because petitioner had not
bought a house and did not reside in any one place. Id. at 1036.
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presented by the rebuttable presumption approach used by the Reg-
ulations29 and their focus on the alien's intent30 raised serious ques-
tions concerning the validity of this approach. 31 Congress supplied
answers to these questions through enactment of section 7701(b).
The Treasury Regulations were supplemented by a number of
Internal Revenue Service Rulings (Rulings). 32 The Rulings tend to
address specific questions and problems. Accordingly, their utility is
restricted to situations they were intended to cover.33 Moreover, like
the Regulations, the Rulings do not constitute law. They are guides
concerning what the Internal Revenue Service believes the law is or
should be in a given situation. Nevertheless, the Rulings played a
part in creating the legal context that prompted Congress to imple-
ment section 7701(b).
Revenue Ruling 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150 is one of the few rul-
ings of general application. It offers guidance on the issue of resi-
dence. It creates a presumption that an alien who stays in the United
States for more than one year is a resident.34 Unfortunately, this
presumption has support in neither the Regulations nor common
law. 35 Moreover, the presumption can be rebutted by the taxpayer
with evidence that he is a transient." Thus, while the Rulings are
another source of guidance concerning determination of an alien's
residential status, the problems of overspecificity and lack of support
in the Regulations and common law undermine their utility.
B. Case Law
Many of the ambiguities and conflicts present in the Regula-
29. The last sentence of Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957) reads as follows: "An alien
whose stay in the United States is limited to a definite period by immigration laws is not a
resident of the United States within the meaning of this section, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances." Id. (emphasis added)
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957).
31. See generally Joyce de La Begassiere, 31 T.C. 1031 (1959) (Kern, J. dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150 (presumption that a year's presence
establishes residence).
33. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-82, 1976-1 C.B. 192 (dealing with alien commuters).
34. Rev. Rul. 69-611 states in part that
"[ilf an alien has been residing in the United States for as much as one year
there is a presumption that such alien is a resident of the United States for the
purpose of income taxes in the absence of facts showing that the alien is, in fact,
a transient.
Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150.
35. Commission on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers, Report on the Definition of
Resident in Section 451 of the Tax Reform Bill of 1983 (H.R. 4170), reprinted in TAX
NOTES, June 18, 1984, at 1318 [hereinafter cited as TAX NOTES].
36. The rebuttable evidence clause of Rev. Rul. 69-611 reads as follows: "A year's pres-
ence in the United States by an alien, does not, however, establish residence beyond doubt. It
merely raises a presumption of residence that may be rebutted by any proper evidence showing
that the alien is, in fact, a transient, that is a nonresident." Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B.
150.
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tions and Rulings have lead to litigation before United States courts.
As a result, courts play a substantial role in shaping the law in this
field.
Courts in addressing the criteria necessary to tax an alien as a
resident"7 have discussed both the application of the presumptions of
residency based on the alien's "declaration of intent to establish resi-
dence in the United States"38 as well as the problems inherent in
presumptions of nonresidency based on visa status.3 9 Courts have
also addressed issues of interpretation of residence,40 motivation for
leaving the country,4" and the timing of an individual's visits.42 Thus,
case law is the most extensive single source of information relevant
to determination of an alien's residential status. It is not, however,
any less burdened with the uncertainty found in the Regulations and
Rulings. Nevertheless, a more detailed discussion of the state of the
common law prior to enactment of section 7701(b) is necessary for a
clear understanding of the problems prompting the statute's creation.
The impact of common law on the relevant legislative enact-
ments has been extensive. Courts have not only interpreted these
sources of guidance, but on occasion have ignored them,43 and even
overruled them.
44
1. Residence Status Based on Citizenship.-Schneider v.
Rusk4 5 exemplifies the occasional conflict between the legislature
and the judiciary over questions of citizenship and residence. In
Schneider, the Supreme Court held that section 352(a)(1) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952,46 which purported to termi-
nate the citizenship of naturalized citizens remaining abroad over a
specified length of time, unjustifiably discriminated against the con-
stitutional rights of naturalized citizens.47 Shortly after the Schnei-
37. See generally Benitez Rexach, 390 F.2d at 631.
38. Commissioner v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584, 587 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
925 (1951).
39. Joyce de La Begassiere, 31 T.C. 1031, 1038 (1959) (Kern, J. dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Dillin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 228 (1971).
42. Id. at 229.
43. Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150 finds no support at common law and no analog in
the Treasury Regulations. See TAx NOTES, supra note 35, at 1319.
44. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional an immigration statute which automatically terminated the citizenship of naturalized
United States citizens. This had the effect of requiring the retrospective payment of taxes in
some cases. See, e.g., Lucienne D'H de Benitez Rexach, supra note 6.
45. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
46. P.L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 269 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1481(a)(1)). This section provided for automatic termination of citizenship of naturalized
American citizens when such citizens resided continuously for three years in the country of
their birth or former nationality. Section 352(a)(2) of the Act terminates the citizenship of
United States nationals when they have resided continuously abroad for five years.
47. Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168-69.
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der decision, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated Ruling 70-
50648 detailing the consequences of the court's holding in Schneider.
The Ruling made clear that the Schneider approach would be
adopted for purposes of determining residency on the basis of citi-
zenship. Consequently, mere absence from United States territorial
boundaries no longer sufficed to expatriate a naturalized citizen. Af-
firmative renunciation of citizenship rights was required before the
termination of such rights and their concomitant duties would be
recognized. 9 The Schneider holding and Revenue Ruling 70-506
begged the question of what constitutes an affirmative relinquish-
ment of citizenship.
United States v. Lucienne D'H de Benitez Rexach50 attempts to
answer this question by establishing at least one standard for relin-
quishment of citizenship for tax purposes. Basing its decision on the
Schneider holding, the court in Lucienne attempted to impose retro-
spective taxation on the taxpayer on the basis of citizenship. Not
surprisingly the decision came on the heels of Revenue Ruling 70-
506. Under the criteria established by the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952,51 the respondent was no longer a United States
citizen .5  However, pursuant to Schneider, the State Department
sent respondent a letter of notification that her expatriation was void
and that she was still considered a United States citizen. The respon-
dent replied that "she had accepted her denaturalization without
protest and thereafter considered herself to be an American
citizen.""3
Under the Regulations, the alien's intent governs with respect to
his or her residential status. But in this case, citizenship rather than
residence was being imposed. The distinction between residence and
citizenship was doubtlessly lost on the taxpayer, for to her the end
result was the same. The United States was demanding payment of
back taxes.
The First Circuit was fully aware of the implications of its deci-
sion. The court noted that "were Schneider used to compel the pay-
ment of back taxes by all persons who mistakenly thought them-
selves to have been validly expatriated, the calculus might shift
markedly."'" Though the Schneider decision was being used for pre-
48. Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970-2 C.B. 1.
49. It has been long established that one of the primary duties of citizenship is the obli-
gation to pay taxes. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
50. 558 F.2d 37 (lst Cir. 1976).
51. The petitioner had remained in France, the country of her birth, for over three-years
and had therefore lost her citizenship under § 352(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952. See supra notes 44-47.
52. 558 F.2d at 39.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. The court stated in dicta that, "[Tihe rights stemming from American citizen-
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cisely this reason the analysis did not shift, and the Schneider ration-
ale was used to justify collection of back taxes. The court stated that
it thought that "the balance of the equities mandated that back in-
come taxes be collectible for periods during which the involuntarily
expatriated persons affirmatively exercised a specific right of citizen-
ship."55 Thus, the court hinged its opinion on the fact that the re-
spondent had exercised citizenship rights56 thereby making the retro-
spective imposition of tax equitably palatable. This is evidenced by
the court's statement that "since the expatriate in fact received ben-
efits of citizenship, the equities favor the imposition of Federal in-
come tax liability.
57
In isolation, the holding in Lucienne appears reasonable. The
exercise of citizenship rights will bring about imposition of taxes.
The court's decision, however, raises some difficult and important
questions. Is the standard imposed by the court a minimum stan-
dard? Is the imposition of tax dependent on the taxpayer's receipt of
citizenship benefits? Ironically, the answer to this question appears
to have been given by the same court eight years earlier in a case
involving the respondent's own husband.
The case was Benitez Rexach v. United States.58 In Benitez
Rexach, taxpayer was a native of Puerto Rico who became an
American citizen through the Jones Act of March 2, 1917.59 In July
1958 taxpayer executed a written renunciation of his American citi-
zenship. Subsequently, a certificate of loss of nationality was duly
approved. Taxpayer, then a resident and citizen of the Dominican
Republic, engaged in extensive contractual activity for the Repub-
lic's dictator, Trujillo. In 1961 Trujillo was assassinated. Soon there-
after, taxpayer applied for a passport to the United States. He
claimed that his renunciation of citizenship was not voluntary but
had been coerced by threats. After extended appeal,6" taxpayer's
ship are so important, that absent special circumstances they must be recognized even for
years past." Id. The court went on to note that among the important benefits the petitioner
received as a function of American citizenship was the knowledge that her children would be
born with the rights to become American citizens. Id. at 42 n.6.
55. The only "right of citizenship" exercised by the petitioner disclosed on the record
was her maintenance of a passport. Id. at 42.
56. Id.
57. It appears that virtually any exercise of any citizenship right is sufficient to impose
taxation. In light of the court's earlier decision in Benitez Rexach, 390 F.2d at 631 (receipt of
citizenship benefits is unnecessary to impose taxation), its present decision adds little guidance
to the potential alien taxpayer at a cost of further ambiguity concerning the number of con-
tacts with the United States necessary to impose a tax.
58. 390 F.2d at 631.
59. P.L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 731
(1982)).
60. The United States counsel denied petitioner's application for passport, and the peti-
tioner took his appeal to the State Department. The Board of Review on the Loss of National-
ity eventually granted acceptance to the application. Benitez Rexach, 390 F.2d at 632.
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passport request was granted and his loss of nationality was
cancelled.
Because taxpayer's loss of nationality certificate was cancelled,
he was considered to be a United States citizen for the years since
his renunciation. On these grounds, the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service assessed taxpayer with an income tax on his
earnings made. in the Dominican Republic.
The taxpayer admitted that, as a matter of law, he was a
United States citizen, thus removing citizenship from the issues
before the court. Instead, taxpayer based his entire defense on the
fact that the United States was "freed of its obligations to him as a
citizen and he in fact lived and existed as an alien to the United
States during the period in question."'" The First Circuit was not
persuaded by this argument. The court found that a taxpayer need
not receive benefits in order for taxation to be appropriate.6 2 All that
was necessary was a relationship between the citizen and the state.
As the court noted,
We cannot agree that reciprocal obligations are mutual at least
in the sense that taxpayer contends. It is sufficient that the gov-
ernment's [obligations] stem from its de jure relationship with-
out regard to the subjective quid pro quo in any particular case.
We will not hold that the assessment of benefits is a prerequisite
to the assessment of taxes. 63
The Benitez Rexach case lends three lessons to the alien inter-
ested in the tax consequences of his contacts with the United States.
First, while a declaration of intent to expatriate ends a taxpayer's
obligation to pay tax on the basis of citizenship, the effect of such
declarations can be undone. Second, without such a declaration, a
taxpayer's citizenship will be recognized as valid, even if his intent
and reasonable beliefs are opposed to such recognition. Finally,
though receipt of citizenship benefits may make the assessment of
taxes more equitable, such receipt is not essential to imposition of
such taxes. For the average traveler who does not seek expert coun-
sel, this set of guidelines is a veritable maze of legal uncertainty.
2. Mechanisms to Gleen Intent: Visa Status and Duration.-
Until 1984 the taxpayer's intent concerning his residence and citi-
zenship had always been relevant to a court's residence determina-
tion. The problem presented by using this intent criterion concerned
the methods through which it could be determined. Traditionally the
taxpayer's intent was gleened from two objective criteria-the dura-
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 55, 57.
63. Benitez Rexach, 390 F.2d at 632.
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tion of the taxpayer's stay,64 and the status of the taxpayer's visa.
In Commissioner v. Nubar,65 Nubar made his desire to be a
nonresident alien known from the outset. His visa status supported
his declarations of intent. At no time did Nubar's visa status classify
him as a United States resident. As early as 1949, however, he asked
for an extension of his visa for one year or until the end of the war."6
Ultimately Nubar remained in the United States for over six years
during the period from 1939 through 1945. During his stay in the
United States, Nubar traded extensively on the stock market,
67
amassing over 600,000 dollars. Despite the fact that his visa and his
written and verbal declarations were to the effect that he was not a
resident or citizen of the United States, the court held that Nubar
was a United States resident for tax purposes.65
Underpinning the Nubar decision was Treasury Regulation 11
29.2 1 1-2.69 The court felt that Nubar did not classify as a mere
transient. Although there was no doubt in the court's mind that
Nubar wished to leave the country, the question was when. Quoting
directly from the Regulations, the court stated that "a mere floating
intention, indefinite as to time, to return to another country is not
sufficient to constitute him a transient. '70 Nubar's intent to be a
nonresident alien was clearly established, and his business in the
United States was of an inherently impermanent nature. 71 However,
the objective duration of Nubar's stay convinced the court that his
nonresident visa status should not bar taxation.72
The use of objective criteria is essential if there is to be any
consistency in the determination of an alien taxpayer's intent con-
cerning his residence. However, the objective standards concerning
the length and nature of a taxpayer's stay, as well as the status of his
visa, may, on occasion, conflict both with his declarations of intent
concerning citizenship, and with each other. For example, the length
of the taxpayer's stay has served to override the presumption created
by his visa status.73 There have also been cases in which a declara-
64. This theme reflects the influence of Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150 (one year's
presence presumes residence).
65. 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 925 (1951).
66. Id. at 585.
67. The record from Nubar shows the taxpayer's extensive stockmarket trading. Id.
68. Id. at 586.
69. Treas. Reg. § 29.211-2 tracks with the present § 1.871-2(b) (1957), which uses the
same language.
70. Nubar, 185 F.2d at 587.
71. Nubar's original purpose in coming to the United States was to travel and see the
World's Fair. Id. at 585.
72. The court also stated that Nubar's original purpose to see the World's Fair was
superseded by the inherently indefinite purpose of waiting until the war was over and travel
was safe. Id. at 586.
73. See, e.g., Rudolf Jellinek, 36 T.C. 826 (1961) (nonresidency found despite declara-
tions of intent to stay permanently in the United States).
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tion of intent to establish permanent residence has been deemed a
sufficient basis for taxation despite the absence of any real contacts
with the United States. 4
Thus, as the cases show, use of the same criteria in evaluating
an alien taxpayer's intent may not be sufficient to ensure equitable
and consistent adjudication of residence cases. It is of equal impor-
tance that these criteria be applied consistently.75 Given the ephem-
eral and fleeting nature of an individual's intent, and the built-in
limitations of a subjective approach, it is unlikely that consistent and
equitable adjudication can result from even the most conscientious
application of the same evidentiary tools.
3. Defining Resident.-Whenever there is a use of terms not in
general circulation, or when such terms are used in a specific con-
text, there is bound to be confusion concerning the meaning of those
words. The law surrounding nonresident aliens is no exception.
Can a person be a United States resident without having a resi-
dence in any one particular place in the United States? This issue
was addressed by the dissent in United States v. Joyce De La
Begassiers.7 6 In this case, the majority turned to the dictionary for
the definition of "resident." The court found the word "usually im-
plies more or less permanence of abode."' 77 The definition must have
appealed to the court because one of the court's primary criticisms of
the petitioner's argument was his failure to name "any place in the
U.S. where Jacques ever established any residence ..... ",'
The dissent took issue with this definition and with the major-
ity's assertion that "some permanence of living within borders is nec-
essary to establish residence. ' 79 Judge Kern argued that the majority
misunderstood the meaning of residence by asserting that mainte-
nance of a place of abode was a prerequisite for residence rather
than a factor to be considered. Both positions have merit.
The majority's argument gives a more concrete standard to fol-
low and thus encourages voluntary compliance. In addition, the ma-
74. See Hechavaria v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
75. The court's decision in William E. Adams, 46 T.C. 352 (1966), presents a good
example of the conflicting results achieved even through use of the same criteria. In this case
two Canadian citizens, William and Hazel Adams, purchased a Florida home. Hazel spent
nine to ten months there while her children attended Florida schools. The other two to three
months were spent in the couple's Canadian home, title to which was in Hazel's name. Wil-
liam spent about seventy days per year in the United States. Despite William's declarations of
intent to reside in the United States, the limited nature and extent of William's stay was
deemed insufficient to overcome the presumption of nonresidence provided by his alienage. But
see Hechavaria, supra note 74 (alien seaman who made declaration to reside in the United
States was held to be a resident despite limited ties to and presence in the United States).
76. 31 T.C. 1031 (1959).
77. Id at 1035.
78. Id. at 1036.
79. Id. at 1038 (Kern, J. dissenting).
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jority's approach not only offers more guidance to taxpayers but it is
also easier to administer. The dissent's position, on the other hand,
seems to be the better conceptual argument. For federal income tax
purposes, the alien's location within United States borders is the im-
portant factual determination, not his particular location within a
given community. If the reverse were true, the salesman who lived
from hotel room to hotel room with no home of his own would be a
nonresident. Such a result does not comport with Congressional
treatment of such travel.
8 0
Conceptual confusion is not the only form of misunderstanding
surrounding the word "resident." Courts have been subject to out-
right mistake. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Nubar, "[tjhe Tax
Court in applying the statute has confused residence with domicile
. ... ', Misunderstanding the terms used in these cases serves to
compound the confusion surrounding the definition of resident.
4. Administration.-A final consideration prompting Congress
to change its approach to the problem of determining an alien's resi-
dence status was the difficulty in administering the various tests and
presumptions found in the Regulations and Rulings. Section 7701(b)
challenged the basic approach to the problem, with ease of adminis-
tration as one of its major goals.
The moment the issue of intent is raised, an extensive factual
investigation is practically inescapable. Under the Regulations and
Rulings, such an investigation is often required. This process takes
time and money. With over 750,000 illegal aliens 2 and 250,000 non-
immigrant aliens83 coming into the United States each year, the cost
of determining their residential status is extreme in light of the mea-
ger return on the investment.
The case most often cited for this proposition is Tongsun Park
v. Commissioner.4 In Tongsun, the court was forced to make exten-
sive findings of fact concerning the various business and personal
contacts the taxpayer had with the United States before it could
render its decision.85 Although Tongsun represents an extreme ex-
80. See l.R.C. § 162 (West 1984).
81. 185 F.2d at 587.
82. I.N.S. ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 49. Under Immigration and Nationalization sta-
tistics, illegal aliens are those who cross United States borders illegally or who enter the coun-
try legally but overstay their visas.
83. Nonimmigrant aliens are those aliens who come to the United States for a specific
purpose, such as tourism or to see family. These aliens may not stay indefinitely, but may, and
often do choose to change their residence status in order to remain permanently in the United
States. See NAT'L COMMISSION FOR MANPOWER POL'Y, MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POLI-
CIES IN THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL REP. No. 20, 112-18 (1978).
84. 79 T.C. 252 (1982).
85. The Tongsun Park court was forced to review all the taxpayer's material contacts
with the United States for a twelve-year period in order to reach its decision. This extended
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ample of the administrative difficulties posed by the pre-Code ap-
proach, its message was clear. Courts were calling for legislative ac-
tion to help with the administrative burden caused by these cases.
Section 7701(b) was the answer to this call.
The enactment of section 7701(b) was a reaction. This is to be
distinguished from legislation advanced in new areas or legislation in
step with previous law. This point is significant when analyzing the
structure, approach, and effect of section 7701(b). The legislative
definition sacrifices fairness in certain circumstances in favor of cer-
tainty. This is partially attributable to the problems which the stat-
ute was designed to address. Nevertheless, in an attempt to keep the
statute within the limitations of equity and fair dealing, the statute
makes exceptions to its overwhelmingly objective approach. These
exceptions raise two basic questions. First, do the exceptions achieve
their goal of making the statute essentially fair? If so, is the cost of
that fairness the same ambiguity and uncertainty that plagued the
law in this area before enactment of the statute? Before the substan-
tive questions relevant to the overall effect of the statute can be ad-
dressed, a brief outline of the essential features of the statute is
necessary.
IV. Structure and Approach of Section 7701(b)
The overriding purpose of section 7701(b) is to provide a more
objective definition of residence, thereby facilitating tax planning, re-
turn preparation, and enforcement."6 The section's structure and ap-
proach lend themselves to this goal.8 7 Thus, while subjective inquiry
is required in certain situations,88 the statute does succeed in creat-
ing a more objective set of standards for imposition of residence sta-
tus on aliens.
Section 7701(b) takes a two-pronged approach to the definition
of residence. The first prong addresses those whose intent to reside in
the United States establishes the necessary contacts to impose taxa-
tion without engaging in the extended factual inquiry required under
the Regulations.89 The second part of the test covers those individu-
als who make no statement concerning their intent to reside in the
inquiry took over thirty-three pages of text. Id. at 252-86.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 468.
87. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984).
88. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (P-H 1984) establishes the "closer connection" test. This
test exempts aliens present in the United States for less than a half year from the substantial
presence test. The test may involve extensive factual inquiry to determine whether the alien is
in fact closer to the United States than to another country.
89. Unlike Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957), this approach includes all those who have
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and establishes a per se rule that such individ-
uals be taxed as residents.
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United States, but nevertheless take advantage of the benefits of liv-
ing in this country.9" An alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence will be deemed a resident from the time he was present in the
United States as a lawful resident. 91 Resident status is also imposed
on those who are present in the United States for a period of time
that meets the substantial presence test.92 The result of this ap-
proach is a greater inclusion of aliens in the resident category.
A. Timing
Because of the obvious emphasis on objectivity, the section's
provisions concerning timing are extremely important.
1. First Year of Residency.-Section 7701(b) provides for
unique treatment of an alien's first and last years of residence. The
tax consequences of an alien's first year of residence93 are appor-
tioned. The alien is taxed only for the portion of the first year that
he is treated as a resident.94 The date on which an alien becomes a
resident is determined differently for those lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence than for those whose residence is determined by
their substantial presence in the United States. Aliens admitted for
permanent United States residence are accountable for federal in-
come tax beginning with the first day they are lawfully present in
the United States as a permanent resident. 95 Aliens taxable on the
basis of their substantial presence in the United States are taxable
on their first year of residency as of the first day they were present in
the United States, regardless of their residential status at the time.
96
2. Last Year of Residency.-The Code apportions the alien
taxpayer's last year of residence in the same way it apportions the
first. The alien taxpayer is not liable for tax on any portion of his
last year of residence after he has ceased to a resident.97 Like the
treatment of an alien taxpayer's first year of residence, the final day
of an alien's presence in the United States may depend on the statu-
90. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984) reflects Congress's intent that "[a]lmost all
individuals present in the United States for more than half a year should be taxable as United
States residents." Id.
91. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (P-H 1984).
92. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984). See infra note 131 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the substantial presence test.
93. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(i) (P-H 1984) defines the first year of residence.
94. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(i) (P-H 1984).
95. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984).
96. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(iii) (P-H 1984).
97. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(i-iii) (P-H 1984). This is the only equitable way to treat an
alien's last year of residence. It will cause significantly less friction in the international com-
munity than another rule taxing the entire calendar year, particularly in instances in which,
for example, the alien ceased to be a United States resident on January 23 and was forced to
pay a tax based on residency in another country.
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tory basis of his residence. If the alien is a lawfully admitted resi-
dent, his final day of residence is the last day he is present in the
United States in conformity with permanent residence requirements
of the Code.98 If the alien's residence is based merely on the length
of his stay in the United States, his residency terminates simultane-
ously with his last day of physical presence in the United States.99
Unlike the Code's treatment of the first year of residence, how-
ever, the Code imposes two additional requirements that must be
met before the alien's termination of residence will be deemed effec-
tive. First, the taxpayer must show he has a "closer connection to a
foreign country than to the U.S." 100 Second, the alien taxpayer may
not classify as a resident at any time during the next calendar
year.101
The Code attempts to ameliorate the potential hardships of
these requirements in two ways. First, by disregarding an alien's
nominal presence in the United States after he terminates his resi-
dency,102 and second, by adding a subjective element to the definition
of presence in the United States during the calendar year following
the termination of residency.10 3 This laudable attempt to achieve an
equitable result may inject more complication and uncertainty into
the definition of an alien's last year of residence than is warranted.
The closer connection test is not at all clear. The confusion caused
by the test is augmented by its combination with the tax home con-
cept which is laden with uncertainties of its own. The two provisions
do, however, ameliorate some otherwise harsh and odd results.
10 4
3. Substantial Presence Test.-The substantial presence test
98. Id.
99. The residency starting date for the alien will be the last day he was physically pre-
sent in the United States in compliance with the substantial presence test.
100. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(B)(ii) (P-H 1984).
101. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(B)(iii) (P-H 1984).
102. Under I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(C)(ii) (P-H 1984) a maximum of ten days "nominal
presence" in the United States is allowed after termination of residency before the validity of
the termination date will be challenged. This allows an alien who has effectively severed all ties
with the United States to return for a brief period to tie up loose ends without fear of inequita-
ble tax consequences.
103. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(C)(i) (P-H 1984) is used to alleviate some of the hardships
inherent in the objective approach generally taken by the code. An alien who has closer con-
nections to a foreign country and who is not present in the United States for over half of the
current calendar year will not be considered a resident for tax purposes. The goal behind this
section is to avoid unfair tax consequences. The "closer connection" mechanism is ambiguous,
and may be difficult to implement. See infra notes 110-12.
104. Without some fairly objective means to ensure that an alien's contacts with the
United States were sufficiently meaniogful to impose taxation, i.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984)
would fail to carry out Congress's will and would become so rigid and mechanistic that it
would fail as an equitable taxation device. It would be a strange result if one alien working
continuously in the United States from January 10 through September 10 were taxed on the
same period as another alien who left his home on January 10 but returned to close the deal on
his home on September 10 and left the country the next day. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(C)(i)(ii) (P-
H 1984) helps avoid such results.
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is the mainstay of section 7701(b). It is an objective standard based
on the length of an alien's stay in the United States. The strength of
the test lies in its simplicity. An alien present in the United States
for at least 31 days in the current calendar year, who has been pre-
sent in the United States in the current year and the preceding two
years for 183 days, when multiplied by the applicable multiplier, es-
tablishes residence under the substantial presence test. 10 The appli-
cable multiplier simply multiplies the number of days in the current
year by one, the number of days in the first preceding year by one-
third, and the number of days in the second preceding year by one-
sixth.' 06 Thus, an alien with an average presence in the United
States of 122 days or more will be a resident of the United States.
1 0 7
Of course an alien who spends 183 or more days in the United States
in the current year will be a resident for that year.
The substantial presence test serves as an objective gap filler for
the Code. Aliens who spend a significant amount of time in the
United States will be taxed on the basis of mere presence. The sec-
tion eliminates the problems imposed by the Regulation's subjective
inquiries10 8 and presumptive mechanisms used to determine intent. 09
Unfortunately, the objective numerical approach used in the statute
has potential for unjust results.
Section 7701(b) accounts for these rough edges by identifying a
number of situations that are exempt from taxation under the sub-
stantial presence test. By far the most significant of these is the ex-
ception for aliens who are present in the United States for less than
half of the current year who can prove a "closer connection" to a
foreign country." 0 Section 7701(b) uses the tax home concept bor-
rowed from the Code sections dealing with deductions for traveling
expenses"' to determine whether an alien has a closer connection to
a foreign country." 2
In addition to the foreign tax home exception, the Code makes
105. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A)(i), § 7701(b)(3)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984).
106. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984).
107. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523, 1524, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 468, 469.
108. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957).
109. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150.
110. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (P-H 1984).
Ill. The definition of tax home used in I.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984) is found in I.R.C.
§ 91 l(d)(3) (West 1984). It reads as follows:
The term 'tax home' means, with respect to any individual, such individual's
home for purposes of section 162(a)(2) (relating to traveling expenses while
away from home). An individual shall not be treated as having a tax home in a
foreign country for any period for which his abode is within the United States.
Id.
112. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B)(ii) (P-H 1984). The Code withdraws this exception in
cases in which the alien has a change in his residence status pending or has taken steps to
change it. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(C)(i-ii) (P-H (1984).
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four transactional exceptions. These exceptions are more narrow and
their purpose is more specific. First, the statute exempts from an
alien's presence in the United States any time spent because the
alien's ability to leave the country was made impracticable by medi-
cal necessity. 113 The Code also exempts three classes of aliens from
treatment under the substantial presence test. Foreign government
related aliens," 4 teachers or trainees, 1" 5 and students'" each have a
provision in the statute exempting them from normal treatment
under the substantial presence test. Congress, however, gives less
reign to teachers, trainees, and students than to foreign government
related aliens. The statute places restrictions on teachers, trainees
and students which limit the total amount of time these aliens can
avail themselves of the exception, and which prohibit stringing the
exceptions together." 7 Thus, under section 7701(b), a student may
not study physics and thereby attain exempt status from the current
year and substantial presence tests, and remain in the United States
to teach physics expecting the same legislative grace." 8
4. Defining Presence in The United States.-Because of the
objective approach taken by the section, the single most important
underlying concept is that of presence. With the exception of Mexi-
can and Canadian commuters, 11 9 and those aliens just "passing
through,"'"2 the statute posits that an alien is "present" in the
United States whenever physically present within United States' bor-
ders.' 2 ' Thus, with these two rather narrow exceptions listed above,
any presence in the United States at any time of day constitutes
legal presence in the United States for the day.
113. It is noteworthy that I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(D)(ii) (P-H 1984) exempts aliens who
are forced to stay in the United States on account of a medical condition, but not aliens who
come to the United States for medical treatment.
114. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(4)(A)(i) (P-H 1984).
115. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(4)(C)(ii) (P-H 1984).
116. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(4)(D)(iii) (P-H 1984).
117. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(4)(E)(P-H 1984) places these limits on students, teachers, and
trainees only. It appears Congress felt that were such limitations placed on foreign government
related individuals, it would do little to further diplomatic ties with foreign diplomats. Evi-
dently, Congressional support for exchanging educational and technical information with other
countries is not as strong as its commitment to international diplomacy.
118. Id.
119. Under I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6)(B) (P-H 1984) an alien who regularly commutes to
employment from a place of residence in Canada or Mexico will not be considered present in
the United States for purposes of the statute on any day he so commutes. In a statute whose
major focus is an increase in objectivity and predictability, it is unfortunate that the terms
"regularly" and "to employment" go undefined. These will be likely sources of future
litigation.
120. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6)(C) (P-H 1984) exempts from "presence" within the United
States any time less than twenty four hours spent in the United States when the alien is en
route between two points outside the United States.
121. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6)(A) (P-H 1984).
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V. Policy and Suggestions
A. Policy
The Code's new section successfully eradicates the uncertainty
confronting an alien taxpayer attempting to determine his residence
status.122 No longer does visa status establish a rebuttable presump-
tion. 123 Once a person is admitted to the United States for lawful
permanent residence, he is a resident alien as a matter of law. 24 In
many instances the section merely turns the concepts underlying the
presumptions into black letter law.125 There are, however, two funda-
mental differences between the approach taken by the section and
that taken by the Regulations and Rulings. First, the subjective in-
quiry into the alien's intent is totally eliminated under the code ap-
proach. While subjective criteria are used in the Code, 126 at no time
is the focus of the Code's subjective inquiry the potential taxpayer's
intent. Second, the Code allows mere presence to constitute sufficient
connection with the United States to justify taxation. 27
These two distinguishing features alone are sufficient to signifi-
cantly increase the number of aliens taxed as resident aliens in the
United States.' 28 Moreover, section 7701(b) will probably include a
large number of aliens in the resident category without their prior
knowledge. Because the alien's intent and expectations are irrelevant
unless voiced to declare intent to establish permanent residence, the
common sense notions that may have served in the past to alert
aliens to possible tax consequences of their connections with the
United States are removed. These distinctions are illustrated in a
number of the section's provisions.
The heart of section 7701(b) lies in the substantial presence
test.2 9 Like the section as a whole, the substantial presence test is
two-pronged. It creates automatic resident status for aliens whose
presence in the United States for one year exceeds 183 days.'30 The
122. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 468.
123. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957) (residence determined by the alien's in-
tentions concerning the length and nature of his stay), with I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(iii) (P-H
1984) (residence determined by the alien's length and nature of stay).
124. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A)(i) (P-H 1984) calls for the imposition of resident status on
all aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, but fails to define lawful permanent resi-
dent for two full pages. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5) (P-H 1984).
125. Compare Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2 C.B. 150 (one year residence presumption)
with I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984) (substantial presence test). See also supra note
123.
126. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (P-H 1984) (closer connection test).
127. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A)(ii) (P-H 1984).
128. TAX NOTES, supra note 35, at 1320.
129. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A)(i-ii) (P.H. 1984).
130. The notion that an alien present in the United States for more than half of the
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substantial presence test also establishes resident status for aliens
present in the United States for less than half a year but who main-
tain regular and prolonged presence 1' in the United States.
Unfortunately, the test is one of the few areas of the section
that may be overly subjective. An alien present in the United States
for less than half of the current year who can establish a closer con-
nection to a foreign country will not be a resident, even if he would,
otherwise qualify for resident status under the substantial presence
test.132 This exception raises two difficult questions for the alien tax-
payer. First, what is a "closer connection?" Though there is evidence
that the term has been in use for over twenty years,' 33 its meaning
remains subject to dispute. Second, how appropriate is the tax
home' 3' concept in an international context?
B. Ambiguity Surrounding the Closer Connection Test
There appears to be no prior .statutory provision using the term
"closer connection."'3 5 Though the concept is not new, it is not
couched in the same objective, easy to administer language that
marks the rest of the statute.'36 The closer connection concept has an
analog in the Treasury Department Model Income Tax Treaty of
May 17, 1977.137 The Treaty uses the language, "his or her personal
and economic relations are closer (center of vital interests)."' 38 This
language, however, has been severely criticized as "highly uncertain
in [its] application, involving factual determinations in each case
which may be extremely difficult to make and very controversial."' 3 9
current year should be a resident is a direct manifestation of congressional intent. See H.R.
REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523-24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 468-69.
131. Substantial presence is determined by a legislative presumption that if the alien's
length of stay in the United States in the first year preceding the current year, multiplied by
one-third, and the length of stay in the second preceding year, multiplied by one-sixth, when
added to the alien's total presence in the current year equals or exceeds 183 days, then resi-
dence is established for that current year. There is no underlying logic or reason behind the
calculus used here. Absent outright knowledge of the law, the alien taxpayer will be afforded
no warning of the impending tax implications of his continued presence in the United States.
Though ignorance of the law is no excuse, and the burden of knowing the law properly rests
with the taxpayeyr, it would be well to make the ramifications of I.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984)
known to the alien public at large, particularly those aliens with extensive contacts with the
United States.
132. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (P-H 1984).
133. TAX NOTES, supra note 35, at 1322.
134. There is less than unanimous accord on the issue of the exact definition of "tax
home." See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
135. This finding is supported by the Committee. See TAx NOTFS, supra note 35, at
1322.
136. This in no way implies that mere ease of administration is indicative of good legis-
lation. In this case, however, given the purpose of the statute, the ambiguity created by the
closer connection concept seems ill fit to the task of clarifying the state of the law in this area.
137. Art. IV(2)(a).
138. Id.
139. U.S. Treasury Department, Technical Explanation of the 1969 United States-
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The goal of preventing unfair taxation when an alien has spent
less than half of the current year in the United States is praisewor-
thy. But the manner chosen by Congress to reach this goal is likely
to cause much uncertainty and consequent litigation. Since this is
precisely the problem the section was created to remedy, such an
approach is ill-advised.
The tax home'10 concept is used in the closer connection to a
foreign country exception to the substantial presence test.' The use
of this concept will serve as the fountainhead of three potential
sources of uncertainty. First, the tax home, as defined by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service" is either the taxpayer's principal place of bus-
iness,1 3 or if the taxpayer has no regular place of business, then his
tax home is his place of abode.' 4 ' In isolation, these definitions foster
ambiguity. Specifically, the terms "principal place of business""' 5
and "regular place of abode"'146 are susceptible to a number of dif-
ferent and conflicting interpretations. In relation to the closer con-
nection test, the confusion surrounding the terms could be a fruitful
source of litigation.
The uncertainty created by this definition is compounded by the
fact that the courts are not in complete agreement with the Internal
Revenue Service's definition of tax home. Some courts have held an
individual's tax home is his residence.147 Other courts have followed
the guidance of the Internal Revenue Service and have held that an
individual's tax home is his principal place of business. Thus, given
the uncertainties surrounding the tax home concept in its domestic
use, it is unlikely that the concept will be of any greater clarity or
aid in the international sphere.
VI. Conclusion
An alternative was presented to Congress prior to the enactment
of section 7701(b). Congress, however, failed to make use of the ad-
vantages offered by the proposal. The Committee on United States
Activities of Foreign Taxpayers (Committee) advocated a place of
accommodation test to be used in combination with the Code's ex-
Netherlands Estate Tax Treaty, 1976-1, C.B. 477, 479.
140. "Tax home" is defined in I.R.C. § 911(d)(3) (West 1984).
141. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B)(ii) (P-H 1984).
142. See Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-11 C.B. 60 (tax home at principal place of business);
but see Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54 (tax home at place of abode).
143. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60.
144. Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54.
145. See, e.g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). "The
meaning of the word 'home' . . . with reference to a taxpayer residing in one city and working
in another has engendered much difficulty and litigation." Id. at 471.
146. See TAx NOTES, supra note 35, at 1321.
147. See, e.g., Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 864 (1971).
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isting substantial presence test.14 Under the proposal, an alien
would achieve resident status if he stayed in the United States over
183 days and had a place of accommodation generally available in
the United States. 149 Place of accommodation is defined in the pro-
posal as "any fixed place used principally to accommodate individu-
als overnight."' 150 "Generally available" is defined as the "exclusive
right to occupy the place of accomodation, and to exclude others
from occupying such place for a continuous period which exceeds
twelve months taking into account any periods of renewal that are
exercised.''
The test proposed by the Committee has three advantages over
the Code's closer connection to a foreign country approach. First, it
is less ambiguous, and more easily understood than the present test.
Use of the Committee's proposal would obviate the uncertain law
surrounding the tax home and closer connection standards while still
providing objective criteria other than mere presence on which to
base residence status. Second, by establishing a set of necessary con-
tacts with the United States the Committee's proposal offers aliens a
kind of common sense notice of potential tax implications. Thus, the
Committee's proposal is more fair to aliens. In addition, the Com-
mittee's proposal coincides with Congress' intention that people who
stay in the United States for over 183 days should be taxed as resi-
dents. 152 Finally, the proposal, which could be used in conjunction
with both the current year and the substantial presence tests,'
would be far easier to administer and enforce because it focuses on
contacts with the United States rather than with a foreign country.
Were Congress to adopt the Committee's proposal, the present
section 7701(b) would be more fair, more precise and easier to ad-
minister. These are the exact goals that Congress intended to
achieve. The Committee's proposal should therefore be adopted.
Rolf E. Kroll
148. See TAx NOTES, supra note 35, at 1320-21.
149. Id. at 1320.
150. Id. at 1321.
151. Id. This control concept encompasses situation in which the place of accommoda-
tion is controlled by a person with whom the alien regularly shares such accommodation. The
Committee uses presumptions in this regard in the case of an alien's spouse or child. Id.
152. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1523-24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 468-69.
153. Though the Committee does not advocate the use of the place of accommodation
test in conjunction with the current year provision of I.R.C. § 7701(b) (P-H 1984), it offers
the same benefit to the current year test that it does to the substantial presence test. By requir-
ing something other than mere presence to establish residence, the place of accommodation
test would be a positive addition to the current year test found in I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (P-H
1984).
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